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I. INTRODUCTION
Settlors create trusts every day. They establish trusts believing the
provisions in the trust agreement will carry out their intent. If the settlor
included an arbitration provision, will arbitration actually occur? Can
you really trust your trust?
Trusts play an important role in estate planning and the transfer of
wealth in the United States. They enable settlors to pass the benefits of
ownership to beneficiaries without requiring those beneficiaries to
accept the burdens of ownership. As trusts gained popularity over the
last one hundred years, a unique weakness became apparent. Trust assets
are susceptible to depletion when disputes arise between parties to the
trust.
Arbitration is a powerful tool available to settlors in the fight to
protect trust assets from depletion by lengthy litigation. However, courts
have been reluctant to enforce arbitration provisions in trust agreements.
In May 2013, Texas became the first jurisdiction to enforce an
arbitration agreement in a trust instrument.1
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part Two provides insight on the
history and development of trust law as well as the interest in arbitration
to settle trust disputes. Part Three explains the factual background,
holding, and rationale of the Supreme Court of Texas in Rachal v. Reitz.2
Part Four analyzes the Court’s decision and its implications. This part
also asserts that the Court ruled correctly by giving effect to the intent of
the settlor, including the arbitration agreement in the Texas Arbitration
Act, and laying the groundwork for arbitration agreements to be
enforced against trustees and beneficiaries on the basis of a direct
benefits estoppel theory.
II. BACKGROUND
Trust law originated under English law but has been subsequently
developed in the English and American court systems.3 Development
came primarily through court decisions that established basic common
law principles.4 States gradually codified portions of the common law.5
* Michael Tipton is a candidate for Juris Doctor at The University of Akron School of Law. He
received a B.A. from Ohio Christian University and an M.Div. from Wesley Biblical Seminary.
1. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013).
2. Id.
3. WALTER L. NOSSAMAN & JOSEPH L. WYATT, JR., TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND
TAXATION § 1.01(2) (2014).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2.
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In recent years, states have enacted more thorough laws in an attempt to
establish a unified body of trust law.6 The Uniform Trust Code 2000
seeks to provide guidance in areas where the law diverges or is yet to be
defined.7 The Restatement of Trusts seeks to provide a codification of
common law principles.8 Thus, the current development of trust law is
seen in court decisions, statutory enactments, and uniform model codes.
Traditional family trusts have three primary purposes: to manage
property, conserve property, and protect beneficiaries.9 Trusts also
provide tax advantages for families.10 One or more of these purposes
usually factor into the creation of a trust.11 These considerations reflect
the importance and personal nature of trust agreements. Due to varying
circumstances, numerous types of trusts emerged, each tailored to
address the unique needs and distinct circumstances faced by settlors and
their intended beneficiaries.12
Despite the development of a variety of trusts, trusts have a unique
vulnerability. Trust assets are susceptible to partial or complete depletion
by litigation. Disputes consist primarily of contests to validity and
interpretation or application of the trust’s terms.13 In either form of trust
dispute litigation, the trustee’s legal fees are paid by the trust.14 The
problem is exacerbated because the attorney for the plaintiff beneficiary
is often paid on a contingency basis.15 Thus, the plaintiff has much to
gain and little or no risk in initiating litigation.16 Whether the trustee
wins or loses, the trust will pay legal fees.17
Arbitration provides an effective alternative to resolve disputes
rather than lengthy litigation. It provides an objective standard of
fairness to disputes.18 Simultaneously, it provides a solution to the
problem of depletion by litigation and avoids extended court battles.19
6. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 389 (9th ed.
2013).
7. NOSSAMAN & WYATT, supra note 3, § 1.02(2), at 3.
8. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 390.
9. NOSSAMAN & WYATT, supra note 3, § 1.02.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Steven Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique,
26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 629 (2011).
14. Id. at 630.
15. Id. at 629.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills & Trusts: Defining the Parameters for
Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC. PROB. L.J. 118, 119 (2011).
19. Murphy, supra note 13, at 635-36.
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Procedure, discovery, and other aspects of a normal trust dispute are
streamlined.20 This decreases the time spent resolving disputes and
minimizes the impact on the trust’s assets.21 Furthermore, arbitration is a
private matter.22 The settlor and beneficiaries are protected from
potential embarrassment because, unlike wills, arbitration records are not
public.23
Arbitration also provides flexibility in fashioning a remedy.24 A
settlor can craft an arbitration clause to meet his specific needs and
address his specific circumstances. Settlors can specify how arbitrators
are chosen and what types of disputes will be submitted to arbitration.25
Settlors may choose to make the arbitration broad or narrow. A settlor
may even tailor the arbitration clause to a small number of specific
situations known to arise often.26
Arbitration provides another distinct advantage for settlors with
complex or unique assets. In this situation, a settlor may desire to
appoint co-trustees, each with specialized knowledge.27 Each trustee
would oversee the part of the trust that corresponds to his unique
expertise. However, the potential for dispute in this case could be high.
To offset this risk, a settlor could craft an arbitration provision to address
this particular conflict. In so doing, they would be able to rely on expert
management, avoid costly disputes in court, and avoid affecting the
rights of the beneficiaries. These examples are illustrative of the reasons
why arbitration has gained popularity in recent years.
A number of states have enacted or revised trust laws in recent
years.28 The trend favors the settlor.29 These jurisdictions seek to
emphasize, as a matter of policy, the intent of the settlor.30 For instance,
some jurisdictions have limited or abolished the Rule Against
20. Katzen, supra note 18, at 119.
21. Murphy, supra note 13, at 635.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Katzen, supra note 18, at 119.
25. Murphy, supra note 13, at 636.
26. Id. at 637. Murphy highlights one such often reoccurring dispute in the trust context. An
arbitration clause could be drafted to cover disputes between a lifetime beneficiary and a trustee that
addresses disbursements made to the lifetime beneficiary. Trustees often favor remaindermen over
lifetime beneficiaries. This inclination towards favoring remaindermen could be driven by a desire
to avoid personal liability or keep trust assets as high as possible. The greater the trust fund, the
more the trustee will collect in fees. Lifetime beneficiaries often have no recourse but to litigate
every time they want to challenge a denial and compel a disbursement.
27. Id.
28. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 6, at 389.
29. Murphy, supra note 13, at 633.
30. Id.
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Perpetuities.31 This allows a settlor to have significant dead-hand
control. Another change is the approval of arbitration in trust disputes.
Arizona, Michigan, and California superseded case law with statutes that
enforce arbitration clauses in trust agreements.32
Opponents of arbitration counter with concerns about the rights of
beneficiaries to access the court system and to challenge the validity of
the trust itself. They also point out an ulterior motive for the adoption of
settlor-friendly laws: the development or protection of the state’s
economic interest.33 Some states have benefitted greatly from settlorfriendly laws, which resulted in the migration of trust assets to those
states.34 In response, other states have adopted settlor-friendly laws to
keep trust assets from leaving their state. Thus, opponents argue that the
primary interest in these laws is economic rather than driven by a desire
to honor the settlor’s intent.
The focus on settlor’s intent, the competition for trust assets, and
the increasing popularity of arbitration has resulted in increased use of
arbitration clauses in trust agreements. However, the enforceability of
these provisions remains a question of debate. The primary question is
whether an arbitration agreement can be enforced against beneficiaries
and trustees who themselves did not sign an agreement to arbitrate.35
In 2013, Texas became the fourth jurisdiction to address the issue
directly and the first jurisdiction to conclude that mandatory arbitration
agreements in valid trusts are enforceable against beneficiaries.36 The
facts and reasoning of that case are set out below.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Facts

Andrew Francis Reitz established the A.F. Reitz Trust in 2000.37 He
named himself as the trustee and his sons, James and John, as sole
beneficiaries.38 The trust was revocable during his lifetime and

31. Id.
32. Nancy E. Delaney, Jonathan Byer, & Michael S. Schwartz, Rachal v. Reitz and the
Evolution of the Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 27 PROB. &
PROP. 12, 15-16 (2013).
33. Murphy, supra note 13, at 633.
34. Id.
35. Katzen, supra note 18, at 122.
36. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 850-51 (Tex. 2013).
37. Id. at 842.
38. Id.
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irrevocable after his death.39 The successor trustee was Hal Rachal, Jr.,
the attorney who drafted the trust.40
The trust contained a provision requiring all disputes to go to
arbitration.41 The arbitration provision stated:
Arbitration. Despite anything herein to the contrary, I intend that as to
any dispute of any kind involving this Trust or any of the parties or
persons concerned herewith (e.g. beneficiaries, Trustees), arbitration as
provided herein shall be the sole and exclusive remedy, and no legal
proceedings shall be allowed or given effect except as they may relate
to enforcing or implementing such arbitration in accordance herewith.
Judgment on any arbitration award pursuant hereto shall be binding
42
and enforceable on all said parties.

The trust further stated that the agreement was binding on “the Grantor,
Trustees, and beneficiaries hereto and on their respective heirs,
executors, administrators, legal representatives, and successors.”43
In 2009, John Reitz sued Rachal individually and as the trustee.44
Reitz alleged that Rachal failed to provide an accounting to the
beneficiaries as required by law and that he breached his fiduciary duty
by failing to account and “by concealing his systematic looting of the
trust for his personal gain.”45 Reitz requested three forms of relief: a
temporary injunction, Rachal’s removal as trustee, and damages.46
Rachal denied the allegation and moved to compel arbitration under the
Texas Arbitration Act.47
B.

Procedural History

The trial court denied Rachal’s motion to compel arbitration, and
Rachal filed an interlocutory appeal.48 A divided Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court’s decision.49 The court held that
an arbitration provision is only binding if it is the product of an
enforceable contract between the parties.50 They reasoned that a trust
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 843.
Id. at 842.
Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Tex. App. 2011).
Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 842.
Id.
Id. at 843.
Id.
Id.
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does not constitute a qualifying contract under those terms because there
is no consideration, and the beneficiaries did not consent to the
arbitration provision.51 The Supreme Court of Texas granted the
trustee’s petition to decide whether an arbitration provision under the
Texas Arbitration Act in an inter vivos trust is enforceable against trust
beneficiaries.52
C.

The Court’s Ruling and Rational

The Supreme Court of Texas ruled in favor of the trustee, Rachal.53
The Court held that the Texas Arbitration Act does not require a formal
contract but only an agreement to arbitrate future conflicts.54 Based on
the settlor’s intent,55 the language of the Texas Arbitration Act,56 and the
theory of direct benefits estoppel,57 the trust constituted an agreement
within the statute. It further held that the dispute was within the scope of
the arbitration provision.58 Therefore, the arbitration agreement was
enforceable against Reitz as a beneficiary of the trust.
Texas seeks to enforce trusts according to the settlor’s intent.59 The
intent of the settlor is determined by the “four corners” of an
unambiguous trust.60 Furthermore, trusts are enforced over the
objections of the beneficiaries.61 In this case, the settlor expressly stated
that all disputes should be arbitrated.62 Where unambiguous language
shows a settlor’s intent that disputes be arbitrated, arbitration must be
compelled if the trust is valid and the dispute is within the arbitration
provision’s scope.63
Reitz claimed that the arbitration clause was not enforceable
because the trust was not a contract. The Court noted that the Texas
Arbitration Act (or “Act”) countenances both contracts and
agreements.64 Because “agreement” was not defined in the Act, the plain
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
1977)).
62.
63.
64.
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Id.
Id. at 848.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 850.
Id. at 844.
Id.
Id. (citing Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex.
Id.
Id.
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meaning of the term and legislative intent were given effect.65 The plain
meaning of “agreement” is broader than its meaning in contracts.66
Contracts require consideration and mutual assent. An agreement only
requires mutual assent, not consideration.67 Furthermore, had the
legislature intended the Act to apply only to formal contracts, they
would have made it clear.68 Thus, both the plain meaning and legislative
intent support using the broad definition of “agreement.”
Under this broad definition, the Court found that the beneficiary,
John Reitz, assented to the terms of the agreement.69 While a party
typically manifests assent by signing an agreement, non-signatories to
arbitration provisions may assent under the theory of direct benefits
estoppel.70 Direct benefits estoppel recognizes assent where a party to
the agreement seeks substantial benefits from the agreement. In this
case, Reitz sought benefits in two ways. First, he accepted the benefits of
the trust.71 Second, he sued to enforce the terms of the agreement.72 A
litigant “who attempts to enforce rights that would not exist without the
trust manifests assent to the trust’s arbitration clause.”73
A valid arbitration clause creates a presumption favoring
arbitration.74 The Court looked to the facts, not the legal claim by
Reitz.75 Because the arbitration clause included “any dispute of any kind
involving the Trust or any of the parties or persons connected
[t]herewith,” Reitz’s claim fell within the provision.76 Thus, the Supreme
Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order consistent with the
opinion.77
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of Texas took a significant step by enforcing
the arbitration agreement of the A.F. Reitz Trust against the beneficiary.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 847.
Id. at 845-46.
Id. at 847.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 851.
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This step lays the groundwork and identifies a scheme by which Texas
and other states could enforce arbitration provisions in trusts against
beneficiaries and trustees. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Texas
correctly honored the intent of the settlor, gave effect to the intent of the
legislature to include agreements in the Texas Arbitration Act, and
applied the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel in the trust context.
A.

The Supreme Court of Texas Ruled Correctly by Giving Effect to
the Settlor’s Intent

Giving effect to the intent of the settlor is a foundational principle
of trust and estate law. A trust is created by a settlor for the benefit of a
beneficiary.78 To be valid, the trust must reflect the settlor’s intent.79 The
substance of a trust “does not depend on the substance of any party other
than the donor herself.”80
The Uniform Trust Code (UTC) is illustrative of the goal to give
effect to the intent of the settlor. The UTC offers a solution to the
contemporary need for flexibility but does so “consistent with the
principle that preserving the settlor’s intent is paramount.”81 The UTC
defends the settlor’s intent by allowing modification or termination to
further the purposes of the trust.82 While the UTC expands the equitable
deviation doctrine to apply to dispositive and administrative provisions,
it respects the settlor’s intent by requiring court action.83 Beneficiaries
may not effect a termination or modification based on unanticipated
circumstances alone. Changes under the equitable deviation doctrine
must be made in accordance with the settlor’s probable intention.84 If a
change is made for tax purposes, it must not be contrary to the settlor’s
probable intent.85 The UTC goes against the common law presumption
that a trust is irrevocable unless expressly made revocable.86 Beyond
reversal of the presumption, the UTC allows a settlor to revoke or amend
a trust unless the terms of the trust expressly provide otherwise.87 The
purpose is to give the fullest expression possible, under the
78. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1647-48 (9th ed. 2009).
79. Id. at 1647.
80. Katzen, supra note 18, at 121.
81. UNIF. TRUST CODE, art. 4 cmt. (2000) (amended 2013).
82. Alan Newman, Elder Law: The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code:
Whose Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 664 (2005).
83. Id. at 664-65.
84. Id. at 665.
85. Id. at 667.
86. Id. at 700.
87. Id. at 701.
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circumstances, to the intent of the settlor.88
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also emphasizes the goal of
giving effect to the intent of the settlor. The Foreword to the
Restatement (Third) notes that one of its two main principles is to make
it easier to accomplish the settlor’s intent.89 This main principle is only
limited by the requirements that the intention of the settlor can be
reliably ascertained and that the settlor’s intentions are not contrary to
public policy.90 This principle grants wide latitude to the donor in
determining the future use of her transferred property. The second
principle recognizes authority by which a settlor’s express intentions
may be modified to contemporary circumstances.91 Even in this context,
the settlor’s intention remains an important factor.
The Restatement of Wills and Other Donative Transfers echoes this
sentiment, stating that the donor’s intent is the controlling consideration
in the interpretation of a donative document.92 As a central element, the
settlor’s intent provides a strong foundation for the application of a
mandatory arbitration clause against beneficiaries and trustees. It is
consistent with both the historical foundations of trust law and current
authorities.
The influence of the settlor’s intent is not unlimited. A settlor’s
intent cannot justify breaking the law, unreasonably restrict the
beneficiary’s right to marry, or disrupt a family.93 Furthermore, the
settlor’s intent cannot automatically defeat elective share statutes.94
However, these are exceptions to the general rule. Conversely, other
rules that override express language of a donative document actually
seek to give effect to the intent of the settlor or testator.95 For instance,
laws that enforce gifts to omitted spouses and children seek to give
effect to a testator’s perceived intent.96 These situations may arise when
a testator executes a donative document and subsequently marries or has
a child.97 Omitted spouse and child statutes presume that the testator
would have changed the donative document, had it been thought of.98 In
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
(2003)).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

UNIF. TRUST CODE, art. 4 cmt. (2000) (amended 2013).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS foreword (2003).
Id.
Id.
See Murphy, supra note 13, at 653 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §4
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id. at 654.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-301, 2-302 (amended 2010).
Murphy, supra note 13, at 654.
Id.
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these cases, the express language does not control unless the testator
expressly indicated intent to leave nothing to the spouse or child.99
Collectively, limitations on settlor’s intent are exceptions to the general
rule that settlor’s intent controls.
Texas courts highly regard a settlor’s intent. In Huffman v.
Huffman, the Supreme Court of Texas stated, “[a]ssuming that there is a
valid will to be construed, it is the place of the court to find the meaning
of such will, and not under the guise of construction or under general
powers of equity to assume to correct or redraft the will in which the
testator has expressed his intentions.”100 The Court supported this
position in the context of trusts in Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v.
Newton,101 where it enforced the settlor’s intent over the objections of
beneficiaries that disagreed with a trust’s terms.102
Thus, based on the underlying policy and the precedent of the
Supreme Court of Texas, the Court’s test for whether the arbitration
provision should be enforced is appropriate. The test states that if the
language of the arbitration provision is clearly expressed, valid, and the
underlying dispute is within the provision’s scope, then arbitration
should be compelled.103
Some proponents of arbitration argue, in the context of a will, that
the testator’s intent should be sufficient to compel arbitration in will
challenges based upon the relative rights of the testator and devisee.104
The testator’s right to dispose of her property is superior to the right of
an intestate heir or beneficiary under a prior will to receive the testator’s
property at her death.105 The rights of an heir or devisee are inferior to
and derivative of the rights of the testator.106 This is evidenced by the
rights of the testator to defeat the expectations of heirs apparent and
devisees by transferring property through an inter vivos transfer to a
different party.107 Statutory intestacy schemes further support the
position. Intestacy statutes are principally concerned with giving effect
to the probable intent of the decedent “rather than protecting any right

99. Id. at 654-55.
100. Huffman v. Huffman, 339 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. 1960).
101. Frost Nat’l Bank of San Antonio v. Newton, 554 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1977).
102. Id. at 153.
103. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tex. 2013).
104. E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from
Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 275,
299 (1999).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 300.
107. Id. at 299.
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that inheres in the status of an heir.”108 The rights of a beneficiary only
exist because the testator granted those rights.109
By analogy, this logic is applicable in the context of a trust. While
there are distinctions between wills and trusts, the policy goal of treating
probate and non-probate assets in a similar fashion should be given
effect. The rights of a trust beneficiary derive from the voluntary act of a
settlor in creating a trust. As in the context of a will, the settlor should be
able to direct and condition the terms upon which their property is
passed. At its heart, the distribution of benefits derived from property to
a third party is a gift.
In this case, Andrew Reitz created an express requirement in the
trust agreement that “despite anything to the contrary, arbitration would
be the sole and exclusive remedy for any dispute of any kind involving
this Trust or any of the parties or persons connected [t]herewith.”110 The
language is unequivocal and unambiguous. It is clear that the settlor did
not want disputes over the A.F. Reitz Trust settled in court.
The Texas Supreme Court also withstood the pressure to acquiesce
to the desires of the beneficiary. This reflects the position of the Court in
Newton. Focusing on the settlor’s intent, rather than the desires of the
contesting beneficiary, solves an additional challenge in trust litigation:
juries are prone to side with the contesting beneficiary.111
The Supreme Court of Texas correctly found in favor of the trust,
giving effect to the wishes of the settlor and defending his right to
distribute his property on his own terms. In so doing, the justices acted
in accordance with precedent. Furthermore, the Court reflected the
prevailing view of the Uniform Trust Code, the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts, and the Restatement of Wills and Other Donative Transfers. The
Court struck an effective balance of competing policy interests.
B.

The Supreme Court of Texas Ruled Correctly by Giving Effect to
the Inclusion of Agreements in the Texas Arbitration Act

The Supreme Court of Texas ruled correctly by giving effect to the
inclusion of agreements in the Texas Arbitration Act. It honored the
intent of the legislature and correctly applied Texas precedent. Rather
than relying on the rationales of other jurisdictions, the Court provided

108. Id.
109. Id. at 300.
110. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 842 (Tex. 2013).
111. Murphy, supra note 13, at 629 (citing John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The
Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63, 64-66 (1978)).
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an analysis that unified theory, precedent, and state law.
1. Four Foundational Theories of Trust Law
Four foundational theories underlie trust law. The most prominent
theory is the donative theory.112 This theory focuses on the unilateral
transfer of assets to a trustee.113 It is the underlying theory of the
Restatement of Trusts position, which defines a trust as a beneficial
conveyance of trust property.114 The Reporter of the Restatement of
Trusts, Austin W. Scott, brought the donative theory to the forefront of
American jurisprudence in the 20th century.115 His influence and
promotion of the donative theory of trusts won out over previously
accepted contractual understandings of trusts with respect to
arbitration.116
The second foundational theory of trust law is the contract
theory.117 The contract theory focuses on the contract-like agreement
between the settlor and the trustee.118 There is an underlying agreement
between the settlor and the trustee regarding the manner in which the
trust assets will be managed.119 As Professor John Langbein asserts, the
basic elements of a contract and a trust are the same – consensual
formation and party autonomy.120
While the donative theory and contract theory are the most common
and frequently relied upon, the intent theory and benefit theory are also
significant. Under the intent theory, the intent of the settlor serves as the
foundation of trust law.121 Proponents of this position focus on the
fundamental values of trust and estate law and focus on the donor’s
rights.122 Enforcement of trust provisions, including arbitration clauses,
is justified by relying on a clear manifestation of a settlor’s intent.123
112. S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND.J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1157, 1174 (2012).
113. Id.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959).
115. Rachel M. Hirshberg, You Can’t Have Your Trust and Defeat It Too: Why Mandatory
Arbitration Provisions in Trusts Enforceable, and Why State Courts Are Getting It Wrong, 2013 J.
DISP. RESOL. 213, 216 (2013).
116. Strong, supra note 112, at 1175.
117. Id. at 1177.
118. Id.
119. Id. The contractual nature of a trust is most apparent in commercial trusts where an
investor buys property for his own benefit under the management of the trustee.
120. Murphy, supra note 13, at 647.
121. Strong, supra note 112, at 1179-80.
122. Murphy, supra note 13, at 652.
123. Id. at 653.
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Because intent is central to the interpretation of both wills and trusts,
intent theory could be used to justify the enforcement of arbitration
clauses in both wills and trusts.124 Furthermore, the intent theory
provides a suitable foundation for the enforcement of an arbitration
clause against fiduciaries and beneficiaries.125
The benefit theory espouses the view that the beneficiary, who
accepts a benefit from a trust, must also take the conditions and
restrictions stipulated by the settlor.126 The acceptance of benefits is an
implied agreement to be bound by the terms of the trust.127 The implied
agreement is the basis for the agreement required by a state’s arbitration
statute.128 This theory rests on a foundation of equity. Beneficiaries are
estopped from accepting benefits without accepting responsibilities.129
Some commentators believe that the benefit theory is well-suited to the
enforcement of arbitration clauses because estoppel theories have been
utilized in arbitration law as well.130
2. The Link Between Trust Law and Contract Law
The courts who have ruled on the enforcement of arbitration
provisions cited the differences between trusts and contracts as the
foundation for repudiating the enforceability of arbitration provisions in
trust agreements.131 However, trusts and contracts have significant
similarities that support a contractual theory of trust law. Similar to
contracts, a trust is based on a written instrument.132 A settlor declares
that he will transfer property to a trustee if the trustee will manage and
use the property and its proceeds in a manner designated by the settlor
for the benefit of the beneficiary.133 For a trust to exist there must be an
offer by the settlor and acceptance by the trustee.134
Beneficiaries also establish a contract-like relationship with a
settlor. Receipt of a gift is consensual because beneficiaries have the
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Strong, supra note 112, at 1181.
127. Murphy, supra note 13, at 648-49.
128. Id.
129. Strong, supra note 112, at 1181.
130. Id.
131. See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); In re Calomiris, 894
A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006); Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
132. David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1027, 1062 (2012).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1063.
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opportunity to opt out of a gift or challenge the validity of the trust
instrument.135 Either of these actions would constitute actions that are
inconsistent with mutual assent. Similar to contracts, consent to the
terms can be fairly inferred where a party has an opportunity to opt out
but does not.136 Parties, including trustees and beneficiaries, manifest
“assent to the instrument by failing to denounce it, rather than by
affirmatively selecting its provisions.”137
Thus, where a trust instrument contains an arbitration clause, the
parties are put to an election.138 They must decide whether to enter into
the agreement or opt out. This is substantially similar to the decision
about whether to enter into a contract.
There are additional significant contractual aspects of trust law that
are applied specifically by Texas courts, which help justify and support a
contractarian view of trust law. First, courts use contract principles to
ascertain a settlor’s intent.139 Trusts and contracts are both interpreted
according to the “four corners approach.”140 Second, courts construe the
terms of contracts according to their plain meaning.141 Similarly, terms
in trust instruments are construed to give meaning to every provision so
that no provision is rendered meaningless.142
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the Texas Arbitration Act
required a written agreement to arbitrate in a contract.143 However, this
is an overly narrow interpretation. The validity of an arbitration
agreement is measured under the principles of traditional contract law.144
Therefore, it is commonly held that a valid arbitration agreement must
satisfy the requirements of a contract or exist within a valid contract.145
Although trusts are analyzed according to contract principles, trusts do
not have to satisfy all the requirements of a contract to make a valid
trust.146 Thus, a legal instrument can be analyzed with contract principles
and declared valid without fulfilling all the requirements necessary to
establish a contract.147 Contract principles merely establish a framework
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
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Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 216.
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Id. (citing Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 366-67 (Tex. App. 2007).
See Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W. 3d 305, 311 (Tex. App. 2011).
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for a court’s analysis of arbitration agreements, not a test for
enforceability.148 By implication, this opens the door for an arbitration
agreement, existing beyond the bounds of a formal contract, to be
declared valid and enforceable.149 Thus, a valid arbitration agreement
could exist in a trust if neither the trust nor the arbitration agreement
violated contract principles.150
In the context of a trust, certain concerns arise when contract
theories are applied to trusts to enforce arbitration agreements. One
prominent concern regards excising the court’s jurisdiction to an
unacceptable extent.151 Concern regarding the excising of a court’s
jurisdiction often lies in the desire to protect the balance of power
between various parties to a trust.152 For example, this could occur by
approving a method of dispute resolution that disadvantages one party or
allows a trustee to overreach the requisite fiduciary duties.153
This concern is overstated. Submitting a dispute to arbitration does
not hinder the balance of power because the law requires that arbitration
clauses be clear to be enforced.154 If the clause is clear, the intent of the
settlor can be ascertained, along with the rights and obligations intended
by the settlor.155 An arbiter could enforce the requisite rights and
obligations of the parties and avoid disadvantaging one party.
Arbitration also can prevent overreach by a trustee. Focusing on
effective accountability, courts seek to enforce the irreducible core
duties of a trustee.156 The arbiter could probe the actions of the trustee,
require accountability, and enforce the terms of the trust.157 Effective
accountability is not limited to the courts if arbitration is binding.
3. Distinguishing Precedent Cases
Prior to Rachal, only three jurisdictions had ruled directly on the
question of whether an arbitration provision in a trust agreement is
enforceable. The first jurisdiction to address the question directly was
Arizona in Schoneberger v. Oelze.158 In that case, a father and step148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Strong, supra note 112, at 1196.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1197-98.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
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mother created three irrevocable inter vivos trusts.159 Each disputed trust
contained an identical arbitration provision.160 The provision stated,
“[a]ny dispute arising in connection with this Trust, including disputes
between Trustee and any beneficiary or among Co-Trustees, shall be
settled by . . . negotiation, mediation, and arbitration,” according to
specified rules.161 The document specifying procedures for arbitration
was signed by both settlors and one of the two trustees.162
The daughters brought separate actions against their father, stepmother, and the trustees of the trust to which they were beneficiaries,163
alleging breach of trust, conversion, and fraudulent concealment.164 The
defendants moved to compel arbitration under the arbitration
provisions.165 The defendants argued that the arbitration provisions each
constituted a contractual provision and fell within the language of
Arizona’s arbitration statute, despite the fact that neither beneficiary
signed the agreement in their respective trusts.166 Alternatively, the
defendants contended that the beneficiaries were estopped from
objecting because they were receiving benefits from the trust.167
As a threshold matter, the defendants had to prove the existence of
a contract between the parties. Specifically, they had “to prove the
existence of a written contract to submit to arbitration,” before the third
party beneficiary and equitable estoppel arguments could be made.168
The court ruled that, as a matter of law, trusts are not contracts.169 The
court reasoned that with a trust the beneficiary receives a beneficial
interest in trust property, while a party to a contract gains a personal
claim against the promisor.170 While a fiduciary duty exists in the
context of a trust, no such duty arises from a contract.171 Furthermore,
trusts do not “stem from the premise of mutual assent to an exchange of
promises and [are] not properly characterized as contractual.”172 Finally,
although a settlor has the right to define the terms of the trust, he cannot
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
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“unilaterally strip trust beneficiaries of their right to access the courts
absent their agreement.”173 Thus, the Arizona court did not enforce the
arbitration provisions.174
The second jurisdiction to address the subject directly was the
District of Columbia in In re Calomiris.175 In that case, a dispute arose
between four trustees of the William Calomiris Marital Trust.176 The
trust was created by a will that contained a provision requiring
mandatory arbitration of any material difference of opinion.177 The four
trustees were siblings.178 After a disagreement arose among the trustees,
the appellant sought removal of the appellees as trustees.179 After the
trial court denied the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, the
appellant sought to compel arbitration.180 In order to prevail
procedurally, the appellant had to show that the arbitration provision
arose from the context of a written contract.181
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals followed the reasoning
of the Schoneberger decision. The court was influenced by the fact that
the arbitration provision the appellant sought to enforce was found in a
will, not a contract.182 Citing the Schoneberger decision, the court found
that arbitration rests on an exchange of promises.183 In contrast, the
foundation of a trust created by a will is the transfer of a beneficial
interest in property to a trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary.184
Therefore, the court held that the arbitration provision in the will was not
contractual and, thus, not enforceable.185
California was the third jurisdiction to rule on the issue in Diaz v.
Bukey.186 In that case, a dispute arose between two sisters who were
beneficiaries to a trust.187 While both were beneficiaries, only one sister
was a trustee. The non-trustee beneficiary requested an accounting of the
financial activities of the trust, and she was unsatisfied with the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1083-84.
Id. at 1084.
In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 409.
Id.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 611.
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accounting provided by the trustee.188 The non-trustee beneficiary filed a
petition, alleging that the trustee breached her fiduciary duties, failed to
distribute trust assets, and used assets of the trust for her personal
benefit.189 She sought relief in the form of removal of the trustee,
appointment of a successor trustee, an accounting of the trust assets, and
reimbursement of any misused assets by the trustee.190 The trustee filed a
petition to compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
provision in the trust.191
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and denied
the trustee’s petition to compel arbitration.192 The court found that the
California Arbitration Act required the existence of a contract to compel
arbitration.193 Furthermore, the policy in favor of arbitration cannot
override the basic requirements of the statute.194 The court found that the
basic requirements of a contract had not been met.195 Neither party gave
their consent to be bound by the arbitration provision in the trust, nor did
the parties exchange consideration to achieve the status of beneficiary.196
Following the reasoning in Schoneberger, the court found the trusts were
not contracts and the arbitration provision in the trust was not
enforceable against a party who had not agreed to arbitrate a dispute.197
The Arizona, District of Columbia, and California courts found that
an arbitration agreement is only enforceable if it arises from a provision
in a written contract. This conclusion flows from the language of
governing statutes.198 The language of the Arizona statute, similar to the
District of Columbia and California statutes in effect at the time of its
ruling, states:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration
or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 612.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 613.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 614.
198. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501 (West, Westlaw through legis. eff. Feb. 24, 2015);
D.C. CODE § 16-4301 (Westlaw through Mar. 25, 2015), CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280, et seq.
(West, Westlaw through ch.2 of 2015 Reg. Sess.).
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199

In contrast, the Texas statute states:
A written agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable if the agreement is to arbitrate a controversy that exists at the time of the agreement; or arises between the parties after the date of the agreement. A
party may revoke the agreement only on a ground that exists at law or
200
in equity for the revocation of a contract.

The key distinction between the Texas statute and the statutes in
Arizona, California, and the District of Columbia is the treatment of
future disputes, specifically the determination of the validity of an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes. This distinction is dispositive. The
then-operative statutes in Arizona, California, and the District of
Columbia countenance agreements to arbitrate future disputes only when
they are included in a provision in a written contract. In contrast, the
Supreme Court of Texas found that an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes is not bound by limits of a written contract.
The basis for the position taken by Arizona, California, and the
District of Columbia is rooted in the precedential reliance on the
Restatement of Trusts distinction between contracts and trusts. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied on the rationale of the
Arizona court in Schoneberger, which in turn relied on the reasoning set
forth in In re Naarden Trust.201 In that case, the court relied heavily on
the Restatement view that a trust is not a contract.202 Austin W. Scott
heavily influenced the Restatement view.203 Scott, writing in 1917,
addressed the inability of contract law to enforce trust agreements.204
With nearly one hundred years of development in trust law and practice,
the distinctions between trusts and contracts are not as profound as they
once were.205 Furthermore, one of Scott’s other primary concerns was
199. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1501. The Arizona legislature took up the issue in 2008 and
passed a new law that validated the enforceability of certain alternative dispute resolution measures
in trusts. The new law provides: “A trust instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive, and
reasonable procedures to resolve issues between the trustee and interested persons or among interest
persons with regard to the administration or distribution of the trust.” Id. § 14-10205.
200. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.001 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called
Sess. of the 83rd Legis.).
201. Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
202. In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1086 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
203. Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A
Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, But Are They Enforceable?, 42
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 361 (2007).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 362. Bruyere and Marino highlight two examples. First, trust law originally made
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that a contractarian approach would shift trust law decisions from the
courts of equity to juries.206 Based on this foundation, arbitration of trust
disputes is not necessarily inconsistent with Scott’s articulation of the
donative theory. Submitting trust disputes to arbitration would keep
them out of the hands of juries.
As stated above, the Supreme Court of Texas found that an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes is not bound by limits of a written
contract. Instead, the court looked to the broader meaning of an
“agreement.” Thus, the analysis of the Arizona, District of Columbia,
and California courts are distinguishable.
4. The Supreme Court of Texas Ruled Correctly that Agreements
to Arbitrate Are Valid and Enforceable under the Texas
Arbitration Act
The Supreme Court of Texas ruled correctly in finding that a trust
falls within the Texas Arbitration Act. Arbitration finds its roots in
economic efficiency. Contracting parties desire to negotiate the terms on
which future disputes will be resolved.207 Thus, arbitration is a product
of contract law.208
The Texas courts grappled with whether trust agreements are
sufficiently similar to contracts to apply contract theories. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas specified that formation of a valid
contract required an offer, acceptance, a meeting of the minds, consent
to the terms, execution and delivery of the contract with intent that it be
binding, and consideration.209 Under this rubric, lack of mutual assent is
fatal to an arbitration clause. Because there is no consideration or mutual
assent between a trustee and beneficiary, arbitration agreements are not
enforceable.210 Thus, trusts were not recognized as being sufficiently
similar to contracts to apply contract theories.
The Supreme Court of Texas analyzed the Texas Arbitration Act to
answer the question.211 The substance and form of a state’s arbitration
law is essential to the analysis. There are two model codes upon which
no provision to compensate trustees. Second, third-party beneficiary contracts were not recognized
under English contract law at the time of Scott’s writing and were still controversial at the time of
their adoption by the Restatement. Id. Today, the acceptance of trustee compensation and thirdparty beneficiary contracts are uncontroverted.
206. Id.
207. Murphy, supra note 13, at 631.
208. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W. 3d 305, 308 (Tex. App. 2011).
209. Id. at 309.
210. Id. at 310-11.
211. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 844-49 (Tex. 2013).
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forty-seven states and the District of Columbia build their respective
arbitration laws.212 The first is the Federal Arbitration Act, upon which
nine states build their arbitration statutes.213 Congress passed the Federal
Arbitration Act in 1925, and the Supreme Court of the United States
subsequently expanded the law’s reach.214 Together, this created a strong
policy favoring arbitration at the federal level.215 The Federal Arbitration
Act requires an arbitration clause to be a written provision in a
contract.216 The Supreme Court supported the contractual nature of
arbitration in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communication Workers of
America.217 The Supreme Court explained, “arbitration is a matter of
contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”218 However, the Supreme
Court has not required an arbitration agreement to be found in a
document that satisfies all the requirements of a contract.219 Arbitration
agreements in “mere written agreements” and other non-contract
documents have been found to be valid.220
The second model code is the Uniform Arbitration Act, upon which
thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia base their statutes. This
act countenances agreements.221 It states that a mandatory arbitration
agreement is enforceable if the agreement is in writing.222 The Uniform
Arbitration Act authorizes enforcement of a broader set of agreements
than simply contracts. While state arbitration laws differ, all states
require a valid arbitration agreement to be in writing, based on mutual
assent, and evidence intent to be bound.223
Federal courts and state courts often come to different conclusions
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements that are “extracontractual.” The U.S. Supreme Court looks to the Federal Arbitration
Act as its guide.224 In contrast, state courts look to their own state’s

212. Murphy, supra note 13, at 640.
213. Id.
214. Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 217.
215. Id.
216. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
217. Hirshberg, supra note115, at 217 (citing AT&T Techs v. Commc’ns Workers of Am.,
475 U.S 643, 648-49 (1986)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 218.
220. Id.
221. Murphy, supra note 13, at 640.
222. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(a) (2000).
223. Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 218.
224. Id. at 219.
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contract law.225 However, case law on the enforceability of arbitration
agreements in trust instruments is limited. The courts that have ruled on
the issue often rely on the reasoning of other jurisdictions.226
Because Arizona was the first jurisdiction to rule directly on the
enforceability of arbitration agreements in trust instruments,227 its ruling
in Schoneberger has been influential. Following the Arizona approach,
the District of Columbia and California courts applied categorical
arguments to find that trust agreements were not sufficiently similar to
contracts to enable enforcement of arbitration clauses found in trusts.
The Supreme Court of Texas also made a categorical argument but
came to a different conclusion. The Texas Arbitration Act is based on
the Uniform Arbitration Act. It states that a “written agreement to
arbitrate is valid and enforceable if the agreement is to arbitrate a
controversy that: (1) exists at the time of the agreement; or (2) arises
between the parties after the date of the agreement.”228 The court
focused on the term “agreement” and found that an agreement is simply
a manifestation of mutual assent by two or more competent persons.229
Under this broad definition, the court held that a settlor and a beneficiary
to a trust can manifest mutual assent without the signatures of both
parties. Therefore, a trust does fall within the definition of an agreement
under the Texas Arbitration Act, and mandatory arbitration clauses in
trust agreements can be enforced. This is a significant shift from the
other jurisdictions that have ruled on the issue.
5. Conclusion
The similarities between trusts and contracts are significant. Trusts
are analyzed by contract principles. At the heart of a trust is an
agreement, and the Texas Arbitration Act enforces agreements. This
forms the basis for the enforcement of an arbitration provision found
within a trust. While it is not conclusive, the broad interpretation of the
definition of an agreement opens the door for enforcement of an
arbitration provision based upon the theory of direct benefits estoppel.
C.

The Supreme Court of Texas Laid the Groundwork for Enforcing

225. Id.
226. See In re Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 409-10 (D.C. 2006); Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d
610, 614-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
227. Hirshberg, supra note 115, at 220.
228. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.001(a) (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called
Sess. of the 83rd Legis.).
229. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 845 (2013).
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Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Trust Agreements
Courts have justified the enforcement of mandatory arbitration
provisions in contracts because the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes.230
The challenge in applying contract theories to trusts is that neither the
beneficiary nor the trustee signed a contract with the settlor in which
they agreed to the arbitration provision. However, arbitration statutes
generally do not include a Statute of Frauds provision requiring parties
to be signatories to the agreement.231 The basic requirement is simply
that the agreement be in writing. Thus, courts may rely on other theories
to bind non-signatories to arbitration provisions in trust agreements.
1. Theories Binding Non-Signatories to Arbitration Provisions
Both federal and state courts recognize principles of contract law
that can bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement.232 Federal
courts and various state courts have recognized six theories that may
bind non-signatories to arbitration agreements: (1) incorporation by
reference; (2) assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) third-party
beneficiary; and (6) equitable estoppel.233
These theories affirm the principle that a party who has not signed a
contract may be required to submit to arbitration. Under the
incorporation by reference theory, the non-signatory is bound by signing
a separate agreement in which he expressly agreed to be bound by an
arbitration agreement.234 The assumption theory is based upon the
presupposition that the party succeeded to the obligation to arbitration.235
Under the agency theory, the non-signatory is a vicarious party to the
agreement.236 The alter ego theory espouses the position that the nonsignatory was a de facto signatory.237 The third party beneficiary theory
is based upon the fact that the parties to the contract intended the non-

230. Katzen, supra note 18, at 121.
231. J. Douglas Uloth & J. Hamilton Rial III, Equitable Estoppel as a Basis for Compelling
Nonsignatories to Arbitrate – A Bridge Too Far?, 21 REV. LIT. 593, 597 (2002). The authors note
that the Federal Arbitration Act, which serves as a model for many state arbitration laws, simply
requires an arbitration agreement to be in writing.
232. Christina Crozier, Estoppel Doctrine Allows Arbitration Provisions to Be Enforced By
and Against Non-Signatories, 46 HOUSTON LAW. 12, 13 (2008).
233. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005).
234. Dwayne E. Williams, Binding Nonsignatories To Arbitration Agreements, 25 FRANCHISE
L.J. 175, 176 (2006).
235. Id. at 179.
236. Id. at 177.
237. Id. at 179.
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signatory to benefit directly from the contract.238
Apart from these five long-standing theories, equitable estoppel
was recognized in the 1960s as a circumstance in which a contract could
be implied.239 Equitable estoppel is “the doctrine by which a person may
be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.”240
Direct benefits estoppel is a particular iteration of the equitable estoppel
doctrine.
Direct benefits estoppel establishes the rule that a beneficiary who
accepts benefits from a will or trust impliedly agrees to be bound by its
terms.241 It may be applied to bind a non-signatory plaintiff to arbitrate
where a signatory seeks to compel arbitration.242 There are two broad
categories of situations that would give rise to the theory’s application:
(1) when a non-signatory pursues an action based on the terms of a
contract, and (2) when the non-signatory seeks and obtains benefits from
the contract.243 When a non-signatory takes one or both of these actions,
she has embraced the contract. The underlying theory is that a nonsignatory cannot defeat the contract in order to avoid its burdens while at
the same time enforce the contract to gain its benefits. As summarized in
In re Weekley Homes, a non-signatory cannot “have his contract and
defeat it too.”244
As applied in contract situations, parties may be bound when a nonsignatory party pursues a claim under the contract or when the nonsignatory seeks and obtains substantial benefits from the contract.245
Merely being related to a contract is not sufficient grounds to bind a
non-signatory to an arbitration clause.246 Arbitration should only be
compelled when a non-signatory seeks to derive a direct benefit from a
contract containing an arbitration provision.247
At the federal level, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated
limits to the doctrine in Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc.
The court clarified that the non-signatory must knowingly seek a benefit
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or enforcement of provision in a contract.248 Without actual knowledge
of the underlying contract, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the
doctrine.249
While appearing similar, direct benefits estoppel and the third party
beneficiary theory are distinct. The foundation of direct benefits estoppel
is reliance on or exploitation of the underlying contract.250 The third
party beneficiary theory is based upon the intent of the signatories at the
time the contract was signed.251
2. Texas’s Adoption of Direct Benefits Estoppel Theory
Texas adopted the direct benefits estoppel theory in In re Kellogg
Brown & Root, Inc.252 Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR) served as a
sub-subcontractor supplying labor, equipment, and facilities for the
construction of elevator trunks to be used on a cruise ship.253 After the
cruise ship buyer declared bankruptcy, KBR asserted liens on the
elevator trunks to protect its interests and sought to recover damages
against the subcontractor and general contractor.254 The general
contractor sought to compel KBR to arbitrate its claims based upon the
arbitration agreement between the general contractor and the
subcontractor.255 The Court determined that KBR was not required to
arbitrate a claim against a contractor with whom they did not sign a
contract.256 While the dispute was related to the claim, that was not
sufficient to compel a non-signatory to arbitrate. The Court held that a
non-signatory should be compelled to arbitrate a claim only if it seeks to
derive a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration
provision.257
The court expanded the application of the rule in In re Weekley
Homes.258 In that case, Weekley Homes signed a contract with a home
248. Noble Drilling Servs., Inc. v. Certex USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2010).
249. Id. at 475. Where there is not actual knowledge of an underlying contract, the basis of a
plaintiff’s claim may be based on other representations made by the parties or general duties implied
by law on the party or parties seeking to compel arbitration. Thus, when a party or court seeks to
apply the theory of direct benefits estoppel, the party against whom the theory is applied may be
able to assert lack of actual knowledge as an affirmative defense.
250. Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 739.
251. Id.
252. In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005).
253. Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 735.
254. Id. at 735-36.
255. Id. at 735.
256. Id. at 741.
257. Id.
258. In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2005).
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purchaser that contained an agreement to arbitrate “any claim, dispute,
or cause of action between the Purchaser and Seller.”259 After
construction defects became apparent, the purchaser, the purchaser’s
trust, which held title to the home, and the purchaser’s daughter all
brought actions against Weekley Homes.260 Responding to Weekley
Homes’ motion to compel arbitration, the trial court granted the motion
with respect to the purchaser and the purchaser’s trust.261
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether the
purchaser’s daughter, who brought a claim in tort, should also be
compelled to arbitrate.262 The Court stated that a “nonparty may be
compelled to arbitrate if it deliberately seeks and obtains substantial
benefits from the contract itself.”263 The Court focused its analysis on
the non-signatory’s conduct during the performance of the contract.264
The purchaser’s daughter had been substantially involved in the
construction process and obtained reimbursement for expenses incurred
during the repairs.265 The Court found that exercise of other contractual
rights and “equitable entitlement of other contractual benefits
prevent[ed] her from avoiding the arbitration clause.”266
The Court was careful to note that recognition of the doctrine of
direct benefits estoppel does not create liability.267 Furthermore, direct
benefits estoppel does not apply when the benefits gained are
insubstantial or indirect.268 However, where one party seeks and obtains
substantial and direct benefits from a contract and the other party agrees,
equity prevents avoidance of the arbitration clause in the underlying
contract.269
3. Application
The theory of direct benefits estoppel is the basis upon which the
mutual assent needed to enforce an arbitration provision in a trust
agreement can be found. Under this theory, the beneficiary who accepts
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benefits from a will or trust impliedly agrees to be bound by its terms.270
Additionally, the beneficiary is estopped from challenging the validity of
a will or trust.271 Thus, the beneficiary would be barred from challenging
an arbitration provision if they accepted benefits under the instrument. In
the context of a trust, as in Rachal, the beneficiary manifests mutual
assent by accepting the benefits of the trust.272 While a beneficiary may
disclaim an interest,273 John Reitz failed to do so. He did not disclaim his
interest or opt out of the provision by challenging the will prior to
accepting the benefits.274
The beneficiary also manifested mutual assent by seeking to
enforce other terms of the trust.275 The trust contained a number of
powers and restrictions on the trustee, including the prohibition from
making “any distribution to or for the benefit of himself which is not
subject to an ascertainable standard under the Code.”276 Reitz’s claims of
material violations by the trustee, Rachal, and request for compensation
were efforts to enforce the terms of the trust. In so doing, Reitz accepted
the terms and affirmed the validity of the trust.277 Because he accepted a
benefit from the trust, he also accepted the burden.
The Supreme Court of Texas made an important clarification in its
analysis. While direct benefits estoppel is generally applied in contract
situations, an underlying contract is not required.278 The Court
analogized to promissory estoppel in this regard.279
Opponents have argued that direct benefits estoppel is not a
workable solution because it only applies to the beneficiary.280 While
this case only applied the theory to the beneficiary, the holding is not
limited to the beneficiary. The Supreme Court of Texas asserted that the
key is mutual assent, not the acceptance of benefits.281 A trustee
voluntarily accepts the responsibility of being a trustee. Just as a
beneficiary may reject the gift offered by a trust,282 a potential trustee
270. Murphy, supra note 13, at 648.
271. Id. at 648-49.
272. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. 2013).
273. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.010 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called Sess. of
the 83rd Legis.).
274. Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 847.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 848.
279. Id.
280. Murphy, supra note 13, at 649.
281. Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 842.
282. TEX. PROP. CODE § 112.010 (West, Westlaw through the 2013 3d Called Sess. of the
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may reject the responsibility. The position is further justified if the
trustee accepts compensation for being the trustee.
Opponents also raise the problem of challenges to validity.283 In
general, this is a problem for proponents of mandatory arbitration
agreements. If the arbitration clause is mandatory, there would be no
option to challenge the validity of a trust. Several states require
challenges to validity to be heard by a court.284 However, Texas has
already established by precedent that direct benefits estoppel does not
apply to validity contests.285 A contest to the validity of a trust is conduct
that is incompatible with the mutual assent.286 Under these terms, a
beneficiary can challenge the validity of a trust, and the arbitration
clause would not be binding. Texas found a way to solve the problem
without swallowing the rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Texas identified mutual assent and direct
benefits estoppel as theories upon which arbitration clauses may be
enforced in trust agreements. If a state’s arbitration law recognizes
agreements and a state’s constitution does not require trust disputes to be
settled in court, the Texas approach justifies enforcement against both
beneficiaries and trustees. In so doing, it gives effect to the intent of the
settlor. This avoids the weaknesses found in applying the intent theory,
contract theory, and benefit theory in isolation. Furthermore, it preserves
the right of a potential beneficiary to contest the validity of the trust.
The ruling enables settlors to act with confidence that the assets of
their trust will not be depleted by lengthy litigation. Settlors will be able
to take advantage of the flexibility provided by arbitration in dispute
resolution. Additionally, it gives settlors confidence that potentially
embarrassing disputes between parties to a trust will be settled in the
more private context of arbitration. Texas has effectively addressed
significant concerns of settlors and established a potential model for
states similarly situated. Thus, for those in Texas and states that follow
Texas’s lead, the answer is yes – you can trust your trust!
83rd Legis.).
283. Murphy, supra note 13, at 643.
284. New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan are representative of jurisdictions that require
validity to be determined in court.
285. Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. SSC Settlements, LLC, 251 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App. 2008).
The Rapid Settlements court held that direct benefits estoppel is inapplicable when a nonsignatory
filed suit for a declaration that an arbitration agreement was not binding on it.
286. Rachal, 403 S.W.3d at 847 (citing Rapid Settlements, 251 S.W.3d at 148).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

29

